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T H E  I N T E N S E  D E B A T E about
consolidation that captured the real estate
industry in the mid-1990s was fueled by a
highly plausible and persuasive economic
argument: real estate, like other capital-
intensive industries, was in the first stage
of a long-run industry transformation that
would prove inevitable (if not unstop-
pable) because long-term comparative
advantages would accrue to those players
operating with the lowest cost of capital,
best access to capital, and most efficient
operations based on cost economies of
scale relative to competitors. This argu-
ment, put forth by Peter Linneman and
others, predicted a major shift to public
ownership and a corresponding focus on
The Halting
Consolidation
Revolution
Despite changes in the real
estate industry, there are
many stumbling blocks to
major consolidation.
L Y N N E  B .  S A G A L Y N
the evolution of true corporate-style oper-
ating businesses that could command pre-
mium valuations based on their value-
added management capacity. The consoli-
dation argument forecast that small, less
efficient REITs would disappear through
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), an
organic market-driven process by which
the surviving real estate companies would
be defined by size dominance. The intense
REIT bull market of 1994–1997 appeared
to support the hypothesis, as did a wave 
of M&A activity during 1997–1998.
Implicitly, if not explicitly, the message was
bigger is better—until the complications
of execution added shading and nuance to
the prevailing logic. 
The logic of consolidation applied to
real estate begged the question of whether
real estate is sufficiently different from
other capital-intensive industries to foil the
inevitability of an industrial transforma-
tion. Bernard Winograd argued in this
journal (“You Say You Want Revolution,”
WRER Fall 2000) that the revolution
stalled precisely because real estate
remained tied to a historical dependence
on debt capital, whereas the logic of con-
solidation presumes a ruling role for equi-
ty capital. Other kinks that were likely to
interfere with a smooth transformation
included: a noisy debate about the right
measure of depreciation in real estate; con-
tinued questions about real estate’s true
volatility and the changing nature of risk
in real estate investing; and real estate’s
contribution to portfolio diversification.
All these issues were of critical concern to
institutional investors whose acceptance of
REITs as a complement to (if not a substi-
tute for) direct investment in their real
estate portfolios has always been viewed as
critical to the development of a public real
estate equities market. 
The past decade of experience added
other questions to the consolidation argu-
ment. The benefits of economies of scale,
for example, might be a function of
achieving critical mass, after which larger
REIT size triggers diseconomies of scale.
There may well be value in being large, but
the question is how large? Similarly, from a
diversification perspective, there may be
value in establishing a presence in several
geographic markets, but as those local
property markets increase in number, so
do the risks of managing widely dispersed
operations. In short, size becomes a factor
that must be managed with increasing
people-based systems, managerial skill,
and strategic sophistication. 
So, with the hindsight of a decade, let’s
assess the record. To begin, consolidation is
an empirical issue. What does the empiri-
cal evidence on economies of scale and
public ownership penetration suggest?
What can we learn from the analyses to
date, and how do these insights modify the
logic or add to our understanding of the
transforming forces that have already
R E V I E W 1 9
reshaped the industry? The late-1990s
REIT bear market evidenced the type of
capital-raising vulnerability that should
have made conditions ripe for M&A activ-
ity, friendly or otherwise. That was the
expectation expressed in the popular press
as well as in trade journals. As measured by
the number of publicly-traded equity
REITs, the industry shrank by about 15
percent from a high of 178 in 1995 to 151
by 2001; during the same period, the aver-
age size of an equity REIT grew signifi-
cantly from $280 million to $974 million
(Figure 1). Yet the real estate industry did
not consolidate in terms of pricing power
or market share. What factors confounded
the logic of opportunity? One answer
seems rooted in the institutional dynamics
surrounding changes in corporate control.
While compelling economic and business
logic provided fertile and necessary condi-
tions for consolidation, M&A experience
during the 1990s suggests that the forces
of consolidation in the public arena faced
well-known institutional hurdles that
raised the bar on execution. 
To date the evidence on consolidation is
preliminary and ambiguous. Nevertheless,
it suggests that at this stage of the process
the metrics for assessing the potency of
consolidation forces may have less to do
with absolute measures of dominance and
more to do with how the public markets
have forever changed the rules of real
estate. There is as well a strong message
about the institutional complexities of
transition from one state of industry struc-
ture to another. 
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Figure I Equity REIT Market Capitalization Outstanding: 1991–2001
Market Average 
Year End Number Capitalization Size 
(millions) (millions)
1991 86 $ 8,786 $102
1992 89 11,171 126
1993 135 26,082 193
1994 175 38,812 222
1995 178 49,913 280
1996 166 78,302 472
1997 176 127,825 726
1998 173 126,905 734
1999 167 118,233 708
2000 158 134,431 851
2001 151 147,092 974
Source: National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts
S C H O L A R L Y  S K E P T I C I S M
Prior to 1990, the research literature on
REITs was both short on quantity and
narrow in focus. The small size of the
REIT market, the limited scope of proper-
ty representation, and a near-total absence
of institutional investors made this
research arena too small, too specialized,
and too atypical to attract many academic
researchers. REITs were of particular inter-
est to a few researchers only because those
provisions of the IRS code that made for
their tax-advantaged status—mandated
payouts, for example—also made the
investment vehicle a natural experimental
control for exploring certain questions of
importance to corporate finance. 
The development of a larger, more
deeply capitalized REIT market repre-
sentative of a broader slice of the universe
of the income-producing property sector
changed that condition. Data on com-
mercial real estate, hitherto proprietary
and the bane of much real estate invest-
ment research effort was now readily
available. With the inclusion of institu-
tional-grade property assets, the scope of
generalization on a significant range of
research issues—capital structure, divi-
dend policy, taxes and share prices,
investment performance, management
focus, alignment and conflicts of interest,
industry structure—expanded signifi-
cantly. In short, by going public, real
estate broadened the long-term prospects
of probing academic research.
Several studies of concentration, merg-
er activity, and scale economies appeared in
scholarly and practitioner journals.
Stimulated by the controversy, these studies
sought an immediate empirical read on the
arguments of the consolidation debate, as
some of the more skeptical titles suggested:
“The Great REIT Consolidation: Fact or
Fancy?” and “REIT Economies of Scale:
Fact or Fiction?” Taken as a set, the research
sought to determine whether observable
rapid growth of the REIT sector over the
decade actually resulted in greater concen-
tration within the real estate industry;
whether economies of scale related to size
(expense cost savings, higher quality or pro-
fessional management), branding, or geo-
graphic concentration (informational effi-
ciencies, monopoly pricing power) actually
exist for REITs; whether larger REITs actu-
ally benefited from such cost efficiencies;
and whether meaningful differences in
managerial ability actually make consolida-
tion economically valuable. The empirical
findings are mixed:
Concentration: Despite dramatic growth
in the size of the average equity REIT and
increasing merger and acquisition activity
during the 1990s, there is no strong and
unambiguous evidence of a sweeping
trend toward consolidation. Measured in
terms of penetration by public-market
ownership, by year-end 2000, the share of
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the investable commercial real estate uni-
verse owned by public companies had
actually declined from its peak; this data
point represented the first contraction in
public ownership for five of the six major
property types (the exception being the
apartment sector, which experienced a
decline the year earlier), marking a reversal
of an earlier upward trajectory for public
ownership. 
Wealth-enhancing merger gains: Nearly
two out of three of the equity REIT merg-
ers between 1994 and 1997 produced neg-
ative returns for REIT acquirers (unless
they were paired-share tax-structure acqui-
sitions) in the immediate days following
the announcement, indicating that these
managers generally failed to capture value-
enhancements for their shareholders.
While the acquired equity REITs regis-
tered positive returns, they significantly
underperformed compared to their non-
REIT counterparts. 
Cost economies: Evidence of cost
economies exists, primarily in the area of
general and administrative expenses and
management fees, but these are the smallest
components of total REIT costs, making
for a small potential impact on perform-
ance. Moreover, the research found that for
G&A expenses little variation exists across
REIT size, while for management fees, dis-
economies appear with larger asset size.
NOI growth and scale economies:
Enhanced ability to grow rental income by
strategic asset acquisitions and higher-
quality and professional management does
not appear to be related to size. Contrary
to the large-REIT hypothesis, an analysis
of twenty-one apartment-focused REITs
(between 1994 and 1997) failed to reveal
evidence that large REITs have higher
NOI growth rates, but rather the just
opposite: in the apartment sector, small
REITs appear to generate higher NOI
growth rates relative to large REITs. 
Branding and scale economies: While
establishing a brand image affords mar-
keting advantages and offers significant
returns in other capital-intensive, serv-
ice-oriented industries, this does not
appear to be the case for multifamily
REITs. In particular, there is no evidence
that REITs with a branding strategy gen-
erate higher income growth rates relative
to the market.
Geographic concentration and scale
economies: There is no support for pricing
power (evidenced in higher income
growth rates) arising from geographic
concentration, at least within the REIT
apartment sector. While geographic con-
centration might allow larger REITs to
dominate smaller REITs by achieving
informational efficiencies with respect to
pricing (or by attracting top management
talent able to choose strong markets), this
potential is undercut by REITs’ control-
ling relatively low market shares in any
one market.
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These academic studies suggest that
size alone does not confer advantage. This
conclusion offers ambiguous evidence. To
the contrarians, it indicates that the central
tenet of the consolidation argument was
faulty. To those who contend that the
transformation will take several decades,
these preliminary findings, based on only a
very modest level of research, cannot pos-
sibly settle the issue: the revolution is still
young. I believe that the jury is still out.
Much more time needs to pass and more
information is needed to assess the ques-
tion of whether or not economies of scale
and meaningful differences in managerial
ability actually make consolidation eco-
nomically valuable. In the meantime, a
number of factors have complicated the
path toward consolidation.
M A N A G I N G  S I Z E
One of the early lessons from consolida-
tion activity is that the cost-of-capital
advantage, while logically necessary for any
capital-intensive industry, is not sufficient
to establish a sustainable competitive
advantage in the real estate industry (at
least not in a REIT format, where turning
properties under a capital-allocation strat-
egy is comparatively difficult to execute).
Size is important for a number of reasons,
but size alone cannot bring on efficiencies.
Capital needs to command not just effi-
ciencies, but operational excellence at both
the property and corporate level in order
to deliver what the public market
demands: predictable, sustainable earnings
along with growth. Size may allow larger
REITs to attract higher quality and profes-
sional management, which by implication
may make them better positioned to
acquire properties and position them for
superior income growth, but that too is
not sufficient. Assuring revenue productiv-
ity from existing operations while manag-
ing the transitions inherent in asset growth
through substantial mergers and acquisi-
tions of companies and portfolios depends
on the development of a strong corporate
infrastructure of sophisticated business sys-
tems. It demands an operational efficiency
that goes beyond, for example, the elimi-
nation of redundant general and adminis-
trative costs. When major multibillion-
dollar REITs merge, as in the case of
Equity Office Properties and Boston
Properties, or Archstone and Charles E.
Smith Residential, overheads are not so
large relative to these companies’ assets.
Moreover, the personnel issues and ongo-
ing costs of blending companies can
swamp even these one-time cost savings. 
The platform for the type of competi-
tive advantage that underlies the logic of
consolidation, as applicable to the real
estate industry, implies a management
model capable of forging a company cul-
ture that can be responsive to the demands
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of two distinct sets of business dynamics:
entrepreneurial sales and corporate disci-
pline. It must be capable of blending both
behavior sets, which mirror the dual char-
acter of real estate as both a physical prod-
uct transacted in local property markets
and an investment asset transacted in
national (global) capital markets. It must
cultivate the type of entrepreneurial man-
agement necessary to succeed at the prod-
uct level in local markets, which are small
and where tenants needs are often unique
to that market. It must also build business
systems of corporate focus and discipline
necessary to aggressively manage the asset
portfolio, maintain a strong balance sheet,
and extract marginal efficiencies at the
operating level. Creating shareholder value
in this manner requires that vision marry
discipline in a new format distinctively tai-
lored to the real estate business, which can-
not elude its highly localized character. 
Not unexpectedly perhaps, consolida-
tion as measured by the level of public-
market ownership penetration (in data
published by Prudential Real Estate
Investors) is greatest in those product sec-
tors where the character of the tenant
market is least localized and the contracts
for space less likely to be single, one-off
transactions: regional malls (34.1 percent)
and hotels (17.1 percent). The tenant
markets for regional malls, dominated by
department stores and chain-store tenants
and those for investment-grade hotels
catering to business and recreational trav-
elers, are large and national in scope.
Multiple transactions with the same ten-
ants are the norm, as are package negoti-
ations. These markets seem to be the ones
most suited to the type of economies of
scale, branding, pricing power, and infor-
mational networks that have character-
ized consolidation of other consumer-
oriented capital-intensive sectors. In the
absence of new management models that
are focused on the development of peo-
ple, business systems, and company cul-
ture, executing the strategy of scale to
apartment, office, and warehouse sectors
where tenant markets are more localized
is likely to remain a significant challenge
to the logic of consolidation.
The real estate industry’s embedded
entrepreneurial culture is both an asset and
a constraint in this task. In a deal-oriented
industry of hard-driving entrepreneurs,
the corporate style has been a rare excep-
tion, until recently. “Style makeovers,”
Winograd wrote, “were reasonably com-
mon among those who aspired to change
from a mobilizer of debt to a mobilizer of
public equity capital, and industry leaders
emerged to prominence who would have
been much less conspicuous in the old
environment.” It may take the next gener-
ation of entrepreneurial-minded yet cor-
porate-trained leadership, CEOs who did
not privately operate the asset portfolios
they built from scratch, to forge the new
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management model that possesses all the
tools needed to push forward the next
stage of consolidation. 
T H E  M A R K E T  F O R  
C O R P O R A T E  C O N T R O L
During a sector slowdown, the forces driv-
ing the logic of consolidation intensify.
Flat performance, weak stock prices, and
minimal prospects for growth make access
to equity capital nearly impossible for
REITs, which have minimal discretion to
retain earnings and must pay out 90 per-
cent of net income. The capital divide
between strong and weak companies
becomes most acute, and prospects for
growth stall. Stable performance at the
property level at best affords few resources
for a public company to do much more
than manage operations. Facing low mul-
tiples and an inability to raise equity
because of a depressed stock price, while
simultaneously being at or close to the
market’s tolerance ceiling on debt, makes
for limited horizons in terms of the cre-
ation of shareholder value. If management
frustration with just operating the asset
base becomes sufficiently high, it might
provide the catalyst for a sale. But, it might
not. Weak REITs can survive, manage-
ment can continue to draw financially
rewarding compensation and maintain
other benefits of control, and shareholders
can continue to receive dividends (assum-
ing adequate funds from operations).
Modest acquisitions can be funded
through selective property dispositions
and, under the appropriate market condi-
tions, development commenced and off-
balance sheet joint ventures pursued.
Though alive, these weakened companies
are not viewed as survivors, and when sell-
ing at substantial discounts to perceived
net asset values, they become obvious can-
didates for consolidation. The dynamic of
stalled growth drives the potential oppor-
tunity: for both private and public players,
it may be cheaper to buy a REIT than it
would be to buy real estate direct.
R E V I E W 2 5
Year Merger
Announcements
1992 0
1993 0
1994 2
1995 5
1996 7
1997 14
1998 18
1999 8
2000 6
2001 8
Total 68
Includes all announced, completed 
mergers in which the acquiring firm and
the target were public real estate property
companies; 54 are equity REIT-to-equity
REIT combinations. 
Source: Lehman Brothers.
Figure II Number of Completed Public Real Estate
Company Mergers: 1992–2001
Consolidation within the public real
estate company sector did in fact accelerate
during a four-year period between 1997
and 2000, when 46 public companies
were absorbed in mergers (Figure 2). The
overlay with the REIT bear market is not
exact, however. Merger announcements
tapered off notably in 1999 and 2000,
years in which the number of secondary
equity offerings, unsecured debt offerings,
and initial equity offerings among REITs
were a fraction of the strong activity
recorded in 1997 and 1998 for each of
these forms of capital raising. Public com-
panies continued to consolidate through
acquisitions of private real estate firms in
1997 and 1998, but this M&A activity
nearly disappeared in 1999 and 2000;
activity picked up only slightly in 2001
and 2002. Toward the end of 1998, the
pendulum swung toward privatization,
with the announcements of investor
groups taking two public real estate com-
panies private. In the next three years,
eight other equity REITs would disappear
from the public sector through privatiza-
tion (see Figure 3 for aggregate data on
public company real estate mergers).
Judging from the pronouncements in
trade journals and the media at the time,
the stage was set for great consolidation.
Wall Street analysts and investor groups
prepared lists of takeover candidates.
Other industry observers anticipated an
increase in hostile takeover attempts.
There was a lot of talk about potential
combinations, but little activity. Mergers
occurred, but they often failed to generate
big premiums for investors. No unfriendly
merger activity succeeded during the late-
1990s REIT bear market, though two hos-
tile attempts failed.
Does the lack of hostile deals suggest a
failure of the takeover market, as might be
suggested by the analogy with corporate
finance, which regards hostile takeovers as
a necessary tool to discipline managers?
Or is this missing element another mani-
festation of how real estate might differ
from other capital-intensive industries?
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Figure III Public Company Real Estate Mergers by Type of Merger: 1997–2002 (June)
Type of Merger Number Total Rank Value
(millions)
Public acquiring Public 53 $81,085
Public acquiring Private 36 $29,828
Private acquiring Public 15 $20,064
Total 104 $130,978
Includes all announced, completed mergers over $250 million in which the acquiring
firm or the target was a public real estate property company, equity REIT or C-corp.
Source: Lehman Brothers.
For a number of financial and institutional
reasons, hostile takeovers of public real
estate companies are difficult and com-
plex, if not impossible. 
On the institutional side, the REIT
excess-share-ownership provision is often
cited as special legal protection and a key
inhibitor of hostile actions, a built-in anti-
takeover safeguard, because a would-be
acquirer cannot build a meaningful own-
ership position. Typically adopted as a part
of a REIT’s articles of incorporation, the
excess-share-ownership provision usually
restricts the number of shares that any
shareholder can own to 9.8 percent or
some lesser provision (to empower man-
agement to enforce the 5/50 rule of the
IRS Code, which prohibits five or fewer
individuals from owning in the aggregate
more than 50 percent of the REIT), and
thereby ostensibly serves to protect the
company’s tax-advantaged status. The con-
ventional wisdom on this point is not firm,
however. While the excess-share-ownership
provision puts in place a hurdle, M&A
attorneys David M. Einhorn, Adam O.
Emmerich, and Robin Panovka have
argued that, in practice, REITs appear no
less vulnerable to unsolicited takeovers
than other public companies. The excess-
share limitation does not make a REIT
“bulletproof.” At best it serves as no more
protection than a “poison pill” and, in
many instances, it is more vulnerable to
attack than a “pill” because the excess-
share-ownership provision has not been
tested in the courts (unlike poison pills, for
which there are legal precedents). The hos-
tile attempt by Manufactured Home
Communities (MHC) for Chateau
Properties, which had announced a friend-
ly merger with ROC Communities in
mid-1996, came close to testing this provi-
sion in court, but after a series of moves
among the contending parties that ulti-
mately resulted in the merger of Chateau
and ROC (though not before ROC sweet-
ened its offer by more than 3 percent to
avert a shareholder revolt), MHC with-
drew its hostile bid later that year. 
The lesson was not lost on REIT man-
agers and boards when the downturn hit
in 1998. To protect themselves against
unwanted takeovers and inadequate bids,
some forty-seven REITs adopted poison
pills between January 1998 and May
1999. Since the board of directors has the
right to waive the excess-share-ownership
provision, or a pill for that matter, in prac-
tical terms, both function to almost elimi-
nate the ability to buy a target without
negotiating with its management or board.
“Bear hugs” such as Public Storage, Inc.’s
bid for Storage Trust Realty in 1998,
which finally resulted in a definitive trans-
action, are more likely, according to M&A
specialists.
The tax-related impediment associat-
ed with change of control actions brought
to the fore in MHC’s bid for Chateau
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highlighted the ways in which a takeover
target with an UPREIT structure has an
additional means to thwart or deter a
takeover. To protect the tax position of
contributing partners, UPREIT operating-
partnership agreements sometimes give
OP unit-holders the right to veto certain
transactions. The existence of veto rights,
as well as put rights that OP unit-holders
generally have, strongly suggests that the
tax issues generated in a potential merger
transaction may be a bigger constraint on
a hostile bid than the excess-share owner-
ship provision. Thus, hostile offers for
REITs involve layers of additional com-
plexity not associated with other public
companies.
The major impediment to unsolicited
takeovers in the REIT arena has been a
perceived inability to justify the type of
premium that would be required in a hos-
tile takeover. The premium paid by Equity
Office Properties for Beacon Properties
Corporation (40 percent over asset value
and 22 percent over stock price) did not
become the turning point in REIT merger
pricing that some expected, but rather an
exception to prevailing practice. As a col-
lection of properties, real estate is reason-
ably straightforward to price. It has rela-
tively fixed income streams and operating
expenses, especially if the assets are fully or
near fully leased and years away from sub-
stantial rollovers. Unlike a manufacturing
company where there may be unpriced
capacity or a financial-services firm where
there may be many synergies from a merg-
er, for a REIT target it is hard to justify
paying a price much above the estimated
value of the underlying properties. If
economies of scale existed, it would be
possible to justify a large premium. But
typically the present value of the anticipat-
ed economies is not large. If the bid pre-
mium were large enough, many boards
would ultimately agree to a sale, as their
fiduciary responsibility would demand
that they do so. But if in offering a large
premium the market perceives the buyer
has overpaid, the buyer will be quickly dis-
ciplined. Companies need to be selling at
very sizable discounts to net asset value for
the hostile equation to work in practice.
Other items add dead weight to the
financial calculus. Unfriendly takeovers are
expensive to mount as well as uncertain.
To the extent that the weakest target com-
panies are also small, several million dollars
of expenses for an acquisition whose out-
come isn’t clear (especially if a proxy battle
gets under way) becomes an expensive way
of acquiring assets that initially were 
considered cheap. In other words, it is pro-
hibitively costly in the REIT world to do
anything that is unfriendly. A final impor-
tant takeover impediment distinguishes the
real estate industry. Unlike other capital-
intensive industries, there is a large private
market, which, as past cycles have shown,
can and will arbitrage significant pricing
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differentials between the public and pri-
vate sides of real estate. 
“One of the reasons industry evolu-
tions take so long,” Linneman asserted in
his 1997 Wharton Real Estate Review arti-
cle, “is that it takes several periods of
industry distress to fully shake out the
weakest operators.”  Based on the merger
evidence to date, this caveat on expecta-
tions seems exceptionally appropriate.
Evidence of continual merger activity,
friendly or otherwise, is an essential thread
of the consolidation argument. Yet in an
industry as splintered and diverse as real
estate, even in mergers of multibillion-
dollar companies, no one company
emerges with dominance and pricing
power. While M&A activity on both the
public and private sides of the market is
clear evidence that consolidation contin-
ues to take place, relative to the size of the
investment-grade commercial real estate
universe, the overall impact on the struc-
ture of the industry, especially at the level of
the local property market, remains small. 
There is widespread consensus about
the manner in which the public market
has changed the rules of the real estate
business. Greater transparency, fuller dis-
closure, and ongoing monitoring of public
real estate companies have increased the
informational efficiency in both local
space and national asset markets.
Ironically, the heightened scrutiny of pub-
lic companies in the post-Enron era is 
likely to be more of an immediate drag on
private-to-public activity. With the public
debt market as a price setter, greater disci-
pline in lending exists through fast and vis-
ible spread adjustments pegged to global
capital markets. And the continued exis-
tence of a large private market for real
estate capital continues to provide oppor-
tunities for capital-market arbitrage. A 
different world from ten years ago, for
sure: more complex, more challenging,
and also more interesting.
Lehman Brothers graciously supplied the merger information
for this paper, which was also aided by conversations with
Matthew Lustig and David Sherman and research assistance by
Ylan Kunstler.
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